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Events that conform to our expectations, that is, are congruent with our world knowledge or schemas, are
better remembered than unrelated events. Yet events that conflict with schemas can also be remembered
better. We examined this apparent paradox in 4 experiments, in which schemas were established by
training ordinal relationships between randomly paired objects, whereas event memory was tested for the
number of objects on each trial. Better memory was found for both congruent and incongruent trials,
relative to unrelated trials, producing memory performance that was a “U-shaped” function of congru-
ency. The congruency advantage but not incongruency advantage was mediated by postencoding
processes, whereas the incongruency advantage, but not congruency advantage, emerged even if the
information probed by the memory test was irrelevant to the schema. Schemas therefore augment event
memory in multiple ways, depending on the match between novel and existing information.
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More than 80 years ago, Bartlett (1932) observed that memory
for new information is better if that information fits with prior
knowledge, or what he called a “schema” (see also Anderson,
1981; Rumelhart, 1980; Tse et al., 2007; van Kesteren, Ruiter,
Fernández, & Henson, 2012). In contrast, other studies have re-
ported the opposite finding: superior memory for information that
is unexpected, for example by virtue of being incongruent with a
schema (e.g., Greve, Cooper, Kaula, Anderson, & Henson, 2017;
Mäntylä & Bäckman, 1992; Tulving & Kroll, 1995; Von Restorff,
1933). However, these seemingly paradoxical findings are typically
observed under quite different conditions, and it is unclear whether
they are mediated by different psychological processes. The present
aim was to bring together these two areas of research by demonstrat-
ing the congruency advantage and incongruency advantage simulta-
neously within the same paradigm and identify factors that dissociate
these “two extremes” of the congruency continuum.
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Some or all of the data have been presented at the following conferences
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presentation: “How Prediction Errors and Schemas Shape our Memories”
at the International Conference on Memory in Budapest, Hungary in 2016;
“Novel Events That Confirm or Violate Expectations Enhance Associative
Memory” at the Novelty, Repetition and the Brain Workshop at UEA,
Norwich, United Kingdom; and “Improved Associative Memory When
Expectations Are Confirmed” at the International Conference for Cognitive
Neuroscience, Amsterdam, the Netherlands (a preprint of the manuscript,
the stimuli used in the experiment and the raw data are available on the
Open Science Framework: https://psyarxiv.com/um4ga/).
This investigation was prompted by an apparent paradox in the
literature, with some studies suggesting that memory is enhanced for
information that is congruent with prior knowledge, but other studies
suggesting memory is better for incongruent information that violates
prior knowledge. Evidence for the latter incongruency advantage in-
cluded our own work showing that better episodic memory is associated
with higher prediction error (Greve et al., 2017), once the use of prior
knowledge at test was controlled. The apparent paradox between the
effects of schema (congruency effects) and novelty (incongruency
effects) in memory was one impetus behind the SLIMM theoretical
framework that we coproposed in van Kesteren et al. (2012), which
reviewed neuroscientific evidence to propose that the influence of these
two factors is supported by different brain systems. Indeed, in that
review, we predicted the current U-shaped function of memory against
congruency, and the dissociability of the two ends of this U-shape, even
though there was no direct evidence for this within a single experiment,
until now. This work is part of a larger program aimed at better
understanding the role of schema and prediction error in memory,
interactions between episodic and semantic memory, and how these
change in ageing, following focal brain lesions, and in dementia.
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There are numerous demonstrations in the literature of the
ability of prior knowledge to facilitate memory for events congru-
ent with that knowledge, that is, that conform to our expectations.
This congruency effect (Alba & Hasher, 1983) has been reported
for a wide range of stimuli and modalities, such as item-color pairs
(Cycowicz, Nessler, Horton, & Friedman, 2008), scene-item pairs
(Liu, Grady, & Moscovitch, 2018; van Kesteren et al., 2013),
item-location pairs (Atienza, Crespo-Garcia, & Cantero, 2011; van
Buuren et al., 2014), and relational information across items (Os-
treicher, Moses, Rosenbaum, & Ryan, 2010), but also word lists
(Bein et al., 2015; Craik & Tulving, 1975; Packard et al., 2017),
stories (Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Mandler & Johnson, 1977),
films (van Kesteren, Fernández, Norris, & Hermans, 2010), and
other multisensory stimuli (Heikkilä, Alho, Hyvönen, & Tiippana,
2015; Heikkilä, Alho, & Tiippana, 2017; Moran et al., 2013). For
instance, congruent color-item pairings, such as the word tomato
presented on a red background, are more likely to be remembered
than incongruent pairings. This event memory (Rubin & Umanath,
2015) advantage has been attributed to easier integration of infor-
mation that matches representations in semantic memory, enabling
the formation of richer, more elaborated representations that are
more easily accessible during retrieval (Craik & Tulving, 1975).
At the same time, information that is not relevant to the current
schema is often remembered less well (Sweegers, Coleman, van
Poppel, Cox, & Talamini, 2015; Sweegers, Takashima, Fernández,
& Talamini, 2014), that is, a schema can both help and hinder
memory for new events.
An equally long-standing but somewhat separate line of re-
search, however, has firmly established the apparent opposite
finding, by which events incongruent with our expectations are
remembered better (e.g., Greve et al., 2017; Hunt & Worthen,
2006; Tulving & Kroll, 1995; Von Restorff, 1933). A cardinal
example of this is the “isolation effect” described by Von Restorff
(1933), whereby an item that is distinct from other items in a list
is better recalled. For example, when a list of words is presented in
the same format except for one (e.g., the word tomato in a list
“APPLE, PEAR, ORANGE, tomato, BANANA”, etc.), the prob-
ability of later recalling that “tomato” was in the list is normally
higher than if it had appeared in uppercase. Schmidt (1991) called
this an example of “primary distinctiveness,” where an item differs
perceptually or conceptually from other items close in time or
space. He distinguished this from “secondary distinctiveness,”
where items appear unusual according to general knowledge (Mc-
Daniel & Einstein, 1986). For example, the word tomato in the
sentence “her blue handbag contained a tomato” is unexpected
because of our prior knowledge about what handbags contain,
which comes from more than the immediately surrounding words.
In other words, we have a schema that handbags do not normally
contain fruit. That participants presented with this sentence are
likely to remember the tomato would seem, at a first glance, to
contradict the above claim that only information that conforms to
a schema is better remembered. Note, however, that the tomato is
not simply irrelevant to the schema about what handbags con-
tain—it is actually incongruent with that schema. This is in con-
trast to the sentence “her blue bag contained a tomato,” where the
more generic concept of a bag (rather than a handbag) renders the
tomato neither particularly congruent nor incongruent. It is this
need to consider more than two levels of congruency that we
propose reconciles the apparent paradox, because it enables one to
demonstrate a nonlinear (U-shaped) relation between memory and
congruency, in which highly congruent and highly incongruent
events are both remembered better than less (in)congruent events.
Thus, whether one finds better memory for congruent or incon-
gruent events when comparing just two levels of congruency
depends where those levels fall on the U-shaped function. This was
the basis of the experimental paradigm we developed here.
Before introducing our paradigm, it is worth considering other
factors that may be important for understanding the mnemonic
advantages afforded to congruent and incongruent information.
One question central to memory research on both schema and the
isolation effect is whether the mnemonic advantage arises at en-
coding and/or retrieval. Research on schema for example has
shown that providing a schema after initial encoding of target
information can still help recall of that information, suggesting that
schema can help organize retrieval (or rehearsal), as well as initial
encoding (Anderson, Pichert, & Shirey, 1983). Furthermore, in the
example of a sentence “her blue handbag contained a wallet,” later
memory for the object “wallet” can be facilitated by using prior
knowledge at retrieval to generate likely objects found in a hand-
bag, until one is recognized from the prior sentence—a so-called
“generate-and-recognize” strategy (Watkins & Gardiner, 1979).
Early accounts of the isolation effect, on the other hand, argued
that it is the surprise that participants experience due to a physical
or conceptual change that attracts additional attention and thereby
facilitates encoding (R. T. Green, 1956; Jenkins & Postman, 1948;
Rundus, 1971). However, these accounts are difficult to reconcile
with examples that an isolation effect, based on primary distinc-
tiveness, can occur even for the first few items in a list (Dunlosky,
Hunt, & Clark, 2000). This finding (in fact already reported in the
seminal paper by Von Restorff, 1933; see also Hunt, 1995) is
difficult to explain in terms of encoding processes because expec-
tations must be formed by a number of prior items before they can
be violated by an isolate. This led to alternative accounts that
emphasize the role of distinctiveness at retrieval (Dunlosky et al.,
2000; Hunt, 1995; Kelley & Nairne, 2001). Bruce and Gaines
(1976), for instance, show that words that are distinct by being
physically isolated are clustered together during recall, suggesting
distinct items might be stored and retrieved together as a special
“unusual item” category. Another view proposes that distinctive-
ness is directly linked to the retrieval context, which provides an
advantage in the processes involved in retrieving items from that
specific context (McDaniel, Einstein, DeLosh, May, & Brady,
1995). Nonetheless, more recent work (Schmidt & Schmidt, 2017)
has demonstrated that unexpected events benefit from processes
operating at both encoding and retrieval, depending on the context
and task demands.
Another consideration is whether the mnemonic advantage af-
forded to congruent and incongruent information arises from the
same or different mechanisms. Here, recent evidence from neuro-
science is relevant, in suggesting that different brain systems
support memory at these two extremes of the congruency contin-
uum. Many years of research have implicated the medial temporal
lobes (MTL), and the hippocampus in particular, in event memory,
and some have proposed that the hippocampus is especially sen-
sitive to novelty or prediction errors (Nyberg, McIntosh, & Tulv-
ing, 1998; Strange, Duggins, Penny, Dolan, & Friston, 2005;
Kumaran & Maguire, 2006, 2009). This suggests that the MTL
might be important for encoding incongruent information. Stan-
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dard consolidation theory then states that, after initial encoding in
the hippocampus, information is subsequently transferred into the
cortex for longer-term storage (e.g., during sleep; Buzsáki, 1998;
Davis & Gaskell, 2009; Ji & Wilson, 2007; Marshall & Born,
2007; Squire & Alvarez, 1995). However, research in rodents has
shown that information can be consolidated into cortex much more
rapidly when it is congruent with a schema (Tse et al., 2007). The
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) seems particularly important for
this rapid cortical learning of congruent information (Tse et al.,
2011), which is supported by neuroimaging findings in humans
(Bein et al., 2015; Brod, Lindenberger, Werkle-Bergner, & Shing,
2015; Preston & Eichenbaum, 2013; van Kesteren et al., 2010,
2013).
These findings provided the foundation for a theoretical frame-
work called schema-linked interactions between medial prefrontal
and medial temporal lobes (SLIMM), which integrates schema
theory with recent neuroscientific data (van Kesteren et al., 2012).
SLIMM defines a schema as an active set of mutually reinforcing
neocortical representations, which affect online processing. A new
event that is incongruent with that schema causes a prediction error
that triggers an MTL system (containing the hippocampus) to
encode that event, including contextual details that are not directly
relevant to the current schema (van Kesteren et al., 2012). This
proposal is based on neuroscientific evidence that links the MTL to
the acquisition and integration of event information (Eichenbaum,
Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007). For example, the detail that the
handbag was blue should be better remembered in the incongruent
example “her blue handbag contained a tomato” than the congru-
ent example “her blue handbag contained a wallet.” Encoding all
details in a surprising event has adaptive value in order to help
identify what might have caused the prediction error, and hence
update schemas to allow more accurate predictions in future (e.g.,
Are blue handbags a special type of handbag?).
By contrast, events that are congruent with the current schema
are hypothesized to trigger a system based in the mPFC that then
enables rapid learning in the neocortex (independent of the hip-
pocampus), though only for those details of the event that are
congruent with the schema. More specifically, mPFC is hypothe-
sized to detect the degree of “resonance” between the perceptual
input and the cortical representations already active (the schema).
When the resonance is high, mPFC is assumed to suppress the
MTL system, so that perceptual input (event detail) that is unre-
lated to the schema is not encoded. This leaves the perceptual input
that is congruent with the schema, which is then rapidly learned
directly within the cortex. The latter is consistent with claims,
contrary to standard consolidation theory, that new information
can be learned in patients with hippocampal damage, provided it is
consistent with a schema (Gilboa & Marlatte, 2017).
Inspired by this neuroscientific SLIMM framework, we set out
to test its behavioral predictions. The first prediction is a U-shaped
function of event memory against congruency, with best memory
at the two extremes of highly congruent and highly incongruent.
The second and third predictions concern ways in which these two
extremes are functionally dissociable. One way that they should
dissociate concerns whether they arise during encoding or re-
trieval. SLIMM predicts that the incongruency advantage arises at
encoding, when prediction errors drive the MTL to store a com-
plete representation of the surprising event, whereas the congru-
ency advantage can also occur after encoding. The latter can arise
for two reasons. First, a schema might be used to generate con-
gruent information at test, as in the “generate-and-recognize”
strategy described above. However, we deliberately designed our
paradigm to rule out this somewhat trivial mechanism. Second,
SLIMM hypothesizes that congruent information is more likely to
be reactivated after initial encoding than is incongruent informa-
tion, which would strengthen memories before they are tested. We
therefore examined memory for events that occurred before a
schema was established and predicted that they would be better
remembered when congruent with the subsequent schema, but not
when incongruent. The second way that the two extremes of the
U-shape should dissociate (and the third prediction of SLIMM)
concerns memory for incidental details of the encoded event. This
should be improved for incongruent events (because prediction
errors drive the MTL system to store the full event), but not for
congruent events (because mPFC suppresses the MTL system such
that details irrelevant to the schema are ignored).
We created a paradigm that manipulates the strength of a
schema and whether events match that schema, resulting in three
conditions: incongruent, unrelated and congruent. An analogy
would be the earlier examples of “her blue handbag contained a
tomato” (incongruent), “her blue bag contained a tomato” (unre-
lated) and “her blue handbag contained a wallet” (congruent).
However, rather than using prior knowledge, we trained people
through feedback to learn schemas during the experiment. Each
schema was a simple rule that related two types of objects, which
is arguably the simplest form of a schema, in the sense of an
abstract structure that can apply to different events. By training
schemas experimentally, rather than relying on pre-experimental
knowledge, we could examine memory for events both before and
after a schema had been learned. The events themselves were
individual trials that varied in the number of exemplars of each
type of object (each trial had a unique combination of exemplar
numbers). Importantly, when testing recognition memory for those
trials, the number of exemplars could not be inferred or guessed
based on knowledge of the rule, that is, any memory advantage for
trials that were congruent with a schema could not occur solely by
applying the schema at retrieval. Furthermore, by making the
number of exemplars relevant or irrelevant to the schema, we
could test memory for information that is incidental to the schema.
We ran four experiments that varied these different aspects of the
paradigm.
Overview of Experiments
The basic paradigm for all four experiments is shown in Figure
1 and contained a study phase and test phase. At study (Figure 1a),
participants learned via feedback which of two types of objects had
a higher value (the rule). In congruent conditions, the rule re-
mained constant across trials; in incongruent conditions, the rule
reversed after the penultimate trial, that is, before the final critical
trial that was later tested; in unrelated conditions, rules reversed
after the first trial (and perhaps further trials, depending on the
experiment; Figure 2). Thus in congruent and incongruent condi-
tions, a schema could be established, which was either violated
(incongruent condition) or not (congruent condition) on the critical
trial (fourth trial in Experiment 1, 3 and 4; third trial in Experiment
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2); whereas in unrelated conditions, only a weak schema, if any,
could be learned. All study events were trial-unique, allowing
subsequent assessment of event memory.
At test, participants were shown “old” trials that were previously
encountered during study, or “new” trials that involved a new
combination of studied objects (Figure 1b). Two decisions were
required for each test trial: (a) whether or not the display had been
seen at study (i.e., the precise numbers of each object paired
together in a trial) and (b) which set of objects was more valuable
(the same task as during study). The primary outcome was the first
decision, which assessed event memory (i.e., memory for a unique
trial). The second decision provided, for new displays at least, a
confirmation of how well schemas had been learned. Importantly,
knowing the schema that applied to the objects in an test trial did
not help to determine whether a specific combination of objects
was previously studied.
Two kinds of “old” trials were tested in each condition. The first
type of “old” trial tested memory for the last studied trial of each
condition (the fourth trial in Experiment 1, 2, and 4; or third trial
in Experiment 3). By the time of the last trial at study, expec-
tations have been formed on the basis of the preceding trials, at
least in the congruent and incongruent conditions. Such predic-
tions are predicted to enhance memory for this trial either when
violated (in the incongruent condition) or not (in the congruent
condition). Memory for this trial should therefore reveal the
predicted U-shaped function, with better memory for both the
congruent and incongruent condition, compared to the unrelated
condition.
The second type of “old” trial was the first encounter of a given
pair of objects, that is, first study trial of each condition (with
exception of incongruent trials in Experiment 3 and 4; see later).
This type of test trial probed whether any memory advantage for
congruent or incongruent trials arose at encoding or postencoding.
Because the rule cannot have been learned prior to first occurrence
of a pair of objects, any difference between conditions in subse-
quent memory for the first study trial should be driven by posten-
coding processes. According to the SLIMM framework, congru-
ency effects can arise during postencoding reactivation, such that
memory for the first trial should be better in the congruent than
unrelated or incongruent conditions.
Figure 1. Illustration of the general procedure. On each trial in the study phase (a), participants saw exemplars
of two types of object, one above the other. The number of exemplars of each object varied across trials, with
specific combinations of numbers (e.g., two umbrellas and three shoes) only occurring once. Participants had to
choose the set of objects with higher value, having been told that one of the objects had twice the value of the
other (e.g., umbrellas being twice as valuable as shoes), but initially not knowing which. They learned this
schema through trial-and-error, with feedback after their choice provided by a green (correct) or red (incorrect)
rectangle. For example, if they chose three shoes over two umbrellas and got negative feedback, then they could
infer that the umbrella was the more valuable object. Occasionally the schema reversed. The number and timing
of these schema reversals determined the three conditions—incongruent (inc), unrelated (unr), and congruent
(con)—see Figure 2. The number of exemplars of each object was relevant to the task in Experiments 1–3, which
was to determine the higher total value (object value times number of exemplars), but irrelevant in Experiment
4, where the higher value object was independent of the number of exemplars. The three conditions were
intermixed (and no object appeared in more than one condition). During the subsequent test phase (b), “old”
displays from some study trials were shown, intermixed with “new” displays that contained new combinations
of the same objects. Two decisions were required for each display: (a) whether the display had been seen at study
(i.e., the precise numbers of each object) and (b) which set of objects was more valuable (as during study). The
first decision provided an index of event memory whereas the second decision, for new displays at least,
measured how well the schema had been learned.
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Experiment 1
Method
Participants. All experiments reported here recruited a
unique set of Cambridge community members from the volunteer
panel of the MRC Cognition and Brain Science Unit, all of whom
had reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, provided
informed consent and received monetary compensation for partic-
ipation, as approved by a local ethics committee (Cambridge
Psychological Research Ethics Committee reference 2005.08).
Each volunteer only participated in one of the present experiments.
The congruency effect has been previously investigated by Brod et
al. (2015), who reported an effect size of d 0.89 when testing 21
subjects. Similarly, Greve et al. (2017) tested 20 subjects and
reported an incongruency effect of the size d  0.57. On the basis
of those reports and in the interest of assessing a fully counterbal-
anced design, we tested 24 participants (15 females; mean age 24
years, SD  3.83 years), which provided 99% power to detect a
congruency effect and 86% power to detect an incongruency effect
using a one-tailed test.
Materials. Stimuli were 120 color images of distinct, every-
day objects (https://osf.io/x692m/). They were divided into six sets
of 20. Two sets were randomly assigned to each of the three
conditions, counterbalanced across participants. Within each con-
dition, trials were created by randomly selecting one object from
each set and randomly assigning it a value of 1 and 2. One, two,
or three exemplars of each object were selected for each of four
trials, with the constraints that the combination of numbers did not
repeat across trials and that the difference in number of exemplars
of each object was no more than one (because larger differences,
e.g., three umbrellas and one shoe, would not enable induction of
the schema as umbrellas would always have greater collective
values regardless). The initial assignment of objects to top or
bottom of the screen was random but was kept constant across
repeated trials.
Procedure. The general procedure for all experiments is il-
lustrated in Figure 1, and the specific design for each Experiment
is shown in Figure 2a. In Experiment 1 participants were presented
with 20 blocks, each consisting of two phases: study and test.
Participants had to learn a rule (schema) about the relative value of
two objects presented in each study trial, and their memory for
individual trials (events), together with their memory for the
schema, was assessed in the test phase immediately following each
study phase. Each phase consisted of trials from three conditions:
congruent, where the rule was constant; unrelated, where the rule
changed frequently making it difficult to learn; and incongruent,
where the rule only changed on the last trial. Prior to the start of
the experiment, participants completed a practice session to famil-
iarize themselves with the procedure.
Study phase. Each study phase presented one unique object
pair for each of the three conditions. Object pairs were seen four
times (each trial with unique numbers of exemplars), so that a total
of 12 trials were shown, randomly intermixed. Participants had to
indicate which set of objects had greater, or if appropriate equal,
collective value. Participants were told one object in each pair had
twice the value of the other, but not which, and that the upper/
lower position on the screen was irrelevant. For instance, for a
display of two umbrellas on top and three shoes on the bottom,
with umbrella assigned the value of 2 and shoe assigned the value
of 1, the umbrellas are of higher combined value and hence the top
display should be selected (top  bottom; Figure 1a). Both the
assigned value and number of items presented are relevant for
Figure 2. Illustration of the design of each experiment. Objects are abbreviated as A and B and for simplicity
their numbers are not shown. The more valuable object according to the current schema is shown in blue and
underlined. Each repetition of a given pair of objects (Trials 1–4) conformed to the same schema for the
congruent (con) condition, but reversed on the third trial (Experiment 2) or last trial (Experiments 1, 3, and 4)
in the incongruent (inc) condition. The schema changed more frequently in the unrelated (unr) condition,
depending on the experiment (see text). Trials for which memory was later tested are shown with a gray
background. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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performing the task accurately. Value assignment remained the
same across all trials in the congruent condition, though it reversed
for that fourth and last trial in the incongruent condition and
reversed for every individual trial in the unrelated condition (Fig-
ure 2a). Participants made their response via one of three buttons
for top, bottom or equal. Some trials did not provide sufficient
information to test the rule (e.g., one umbrella and three shoes), but
such ambiguous trials never occurred on the critical trials (i.e., first
and last trials in Experiment 1), to ensure that correct responses
reflected the accurate object-value assignments. The stimuli re-
mained on the screen until a response was given, followed by a
feedback screen for 1000ms. Feedback was conveyed by a box
around the set of objects with greater collective value, which was
either green if that set had been chosen correctly, or red if the other
set had been chosen incorrectly. A symbol (, , ) was also
presented in the midline between the objects to help learn the
schema. The next trial commenced following a blank screen of 250
ms.
Test phase. For the test phase, object pairs were again shown
with one object above the other, as in the study phase. In each
block, six of the test trials (“old” trials) were identical to those in
the study phase (from trial numbers shown in Figure 2); three
additional “new” trials contained the same object pairs as old trials,
but in a combination of numbers different from any study trial.
Thus, there were two old and one new trial per condition. Old and
new trials were randomly intermixed. Two decisions were made
for each trial: the first testing event memory and the second testing
schema memory. The first decision about event memory was
prompted by the question “old/new?,” which stayed on the screen,
together with the object-pair, until participants responded with one
of six response buttons for: guess old, think old, sure old, guess
new, think new, sure new. Note that the objects themselves were
always old, but the specific number of objects may or may not
have been previously studied. Once a response was made, the
second decision about schema memory was prompted by the
question “wins?.” Participants decided the relative collective value
of the two sets of objects (like at study), using the same six
response options: guess top, think top, sure top; guess equal, think
equal, sure equal; guess bottom, think bottom, sure bottom.
Study performance. If schema were learned in the study
phase, we predicted (a) greater prediction accuracy for last than
first trial of the congruent condition (con_4  con_1); (b) worse
prediction accuracy for the last than first trial in the incongruent
condition (inc_4  inc_1), due to accuracy being below chance in
the final trial following the unexpected schema change; and (c)
worse prediction accuracy for the last than first trial in the unre-
lated condition (unr_4 unr_1), due to below chance performance
for the final trial, assuming that participants adjusted their re-
sponses to the preceding trial (Figure 2a). Given that participants
were presented with three response options (top, equal, bottom),
random key presses would produce accuracy of 1/3. However, the
instruction that one object had twice the value of the other allowed
one response option to be excluded on each trial, because (a) in
trials with two exemplars of one object and one exemplar of the
other, the latter could never have higher collective value; (b) in
trials with three exemplars of one object and two exemplars of the
other, collective values could never be equal; and (c) in trials with
the same number of objects, the collective values could never be
equal. Thus, even without knowledge of the schema (i.e., which of
the objects was more valuable), informed guessing would result in
an accuracy of 1/2. Thus, for first trials for example, we expected
performance to lie somewhere between .33 and .50.
Test performance: Event memory. The main predictions
concerned the final trials of each condition, where we expected
better event memory for incongruent than unrelated trials, and for
congruent than unrelated trials, that is, the U-shaped pattern
inc_4  unr_4  con_4. If schemas also act after encoding, for
example during encoding of subsequent congruent trials, we also
predicted better memory for the first congruent trial than first
unrelated trial, that is, unr_1  con_1.
To control for different biases across conditions to call trials
“old” or “new” (e.g., if participants showed a tendency to call trials
from the congruent condition “old,” even when they were not),
memory performance was calculated by subtracting false alarm
rates from hit rates. To reduce the impact of guesses, we report
only high confidence responses here, though analyses of all re-
sponses revealed a similar pattern (see Supplemental Table S1 in
the online supplemental material). Thus, the hit rate was the
proportion of old trials correctly called “sure old,” and the false
alarm rate was the proportion of new trials incorrectly called “sure
old.”
Test performance: Schema memory. Schema memory was
scored the same way as during study (see above), where correct
performance was defined as the most consistent schema during the
study phase (i.e., that determined the first three trials in the
incongruent condition, rather than just the last trial). For conditions
where each schema applied to an equal number of trials (two),
correct performance was defined by the schema that applied to the
last (fourth) trial. Note that the focus was on schema knowledge
for the new trials, where responses could not be based on event
memory.
Given our a priori directional predictions (as specified above), p
values are one-tailed with an alpha level of p  .050 (though the
vast majority survived two-tailed correction), unless stated other-
wise. Point estimates of effect sizes and confidence intervals are
presented by reporting the mean differences (MD) between con-
ditions and their 95% confidence interval (CI), followed by Co-
hen’s d.
Results
Schema learning and memory. Accuracy during study (see
Table 1) significantly increased from the first to last congruent trial
(con_4con_1: t(23)  14.42, p  .001, MD  .45, CI [.40, .50],
d  2.94), becoming significantly above chance (con_4  .5:
t(23)  10.69, p  .001, MD  .37, CI [.31, .42], d  2.18), but
significantly decreased from first to last incongruent trial
(inc_4inc_1: t(23)  7.80, p  .001, MD  .33, CI
[.40, .26], d  1.60), falling below chance on the last trial
when the schema was reversed, as expected (inc_4  .5:
t(23)  14.14, p  .001, MD  .37, CI [.42, .33],
d  2.89). Performance was significantly worse in the last than
first unrelated trials (unr_4  unr_1: t(23)  1.98, p  .03,
MD  .09, CI [.18, .01], d  0.40) and was below chance
(unr_4  .5: t(23)  3.10, p  .003, MD  .13, CI
[.20,.06], d0.63), as predicted if participants were basing
their decision on the previous trial in this condition. Indeed,
performance for unr_4 trials did not differ from random key
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presses (unr_4  .33: t(23)  0.90, p  .19, MD  .04, CI [.03,
.11], d  0.18) which could mean that participants “gave up”
learning a schema in the unrelated condition due to the frequent
rule reversals.
Schema memory for new trials at test (last row of Table 1) was
significantly better in the congruent than incongruent condition,
t(23)  4.83, p  .001, MD  .12, CI [.08, .16], d  0.99, and
significantly better in the incongruent than unrelated condition,
t(23)  6.97, p  .001, MD  .21, CI [.16, .26], d  1.42, as
expected, with the latter not being significantly different from
chance, t(23)  0.63, p  .54, two-tailed, MD  .02, CI [.05,
.09], d  0.13. These results confirm that participants learned
schemas in the congruent and incongruent conditions, but not the
unrelated condition.
Event memory: Last critical trial (4th trial). The hit and
false alarm rates in the test of event memory are shown in Table 2.
To adjust for possible biases (e.g., toward calling trials in the
congruent condition “old”), memory accuracy was defined as the
difference between hit and false alarm rates (where zero means no
memory).
As predicted by SLIMM, memory for the final study trial
was superior in the incongruent than unrelated condition
(inc_4unr_4: t(23)  2.33, p  .02, MD  .09, CI [.02, .15],
d  0.48) and in the congruent than unrelated condition
(con_4unr_4: t(23)  2.07, p  .03, MD  .07, CI [.01, .12],
d  0.42), confirming the predicted U-shaped function of congru-
ency (Figure 3, leftmost plot).
Event memory: First trial. Memory for the first study trial
was better in the congruent relative to the unrelated condition
(con_1unr_1: t(23)  2.01, p  .03, MD  .07, CI [.01, .13],
d 0.41) and relative to the incongruent condition (con_1inc_1:
t(23)  2.93, p  .004, MD  .09, CI [.04, .14], d  0.60; see
Figure 4). Because the conditions were effectively equivalent for
the first trial, better memory for first congruent trials suggests that
the benefits of schema congruency on memory can also arise after
encoding.
Discussion
Event memory for final trials was a U-shaped function of
congruency, with superior memory for incongruent and congruent
trials relative to unrelated trials. This supports the first prediction
of the SLIMM framework. A second prediction of SLIMM was
that the two ends of this U-shape are supported by different
mechanisms, with the incongruency advantage arising at encoding,
but the congruency advantage also potentially arising postencod-
ing. This prediction was also supported by the data, which showed
that event memory for the first trial (before a schema was estab-
lished or the conditions even differed) did not differ significantly
Table 1
Mean (With 95% Confidence Interval in Brackets) of Proportion
of Correct Responses Across All Four Trials (Rep) at Study
(Rows 1–4) and of Schema Memory for New Trials at Test as a
Function of Each Condition—Incongruent (Inc), Unrelated
(Unr) and Congruent (Con)—in Each Experiment
Experiment Inc Unr Con
Experiment 1
Rep
1 .46 (.05) .47 (.05) .42 (.04)
2 .79 (.09) .18 (.05) .82 (.07)
3 .79(.07) .53 (.09) .84 (.07)
4 .13 (.05) .37 (.08) .87 (.07)
Test .73 (.07) .52 (.07) .85 (.08)
Experiment 2
Rep
1 .42 (.04) .35 (.06) .40 (.05)
2 .73 (.04) .14 (.05) .76 (.05)
3 .15 (.04) .20 (.06) .82 (.03)
4 .64 (.08) .67 (.07) .88 (.04)
Test .56 (.04) .55 (.03) .72 (.05)
Experiment 3
Rep
1 .47 (.04) .40 (.05) .43 (.05)
2 .73 (.07) .19 (.04) .78 (.05)
3 .80 (.05) .62 (.06) .80 (.05)
4 .12 (.03) .70 (.06) .86 (.04)
Test .65 (.07) .73 (.08) .84 (.06)
Experiment 4
Rep
1 .48 (.03) .53 (.06) .41 (.06)
2 .76 (.08) .57 (.07) .81 (.06)
3 .88 (.04) .47 (.06) .80 (.05)
4 .21 (.07) .56 (.04) .71 (.07)
Test .65 (.06) .66 (.08) .85 (.05)
Note. For raw data, see https://osf.io/ng3w9/.
Table 2
Mean (and 95% Confidence Interval in Brackets) Performance
at Test for High Confidence Responses (for Data Collapsed
Across Confidence, See Online Supplemental Material)
Experiment Inc Unr Con
Experiment 1
Repetition
1 .28 (.10) .28 (.11) .35 (.10)
2 — — —
3 — — —
4 .43 (.09) .32 (.10) .39 (.09)
New (FA) .11 (.06) .08 (.05) .09 (.05)
Experiment 2
Repetition
1 .32 (.07) .30 (.08) .33 (.08)
2 — — —
3 .39 (.10) .34 (.09) .44 (.09)
4 — — —
New (FA) .13 (.05) .13 (.05) .14 (.07)
Experiment 3
Repetition
1 — .28 (.08) .33 (.09)
2 — — —
3 .31 (.08) — —
4 .48 (.09) .39 (.08) .44 (.09)
New (FA) .09 (.05) .15 (.06) .12 (.05)
Experiment 4
Repetition
1 — .33 (.10) .33 (.10)
2 — — —
3 .29 (.09) — —
4 .46 (.11) .34 (.09) .35 (.10)
New (FA) .20 (.08) .21 (.08) .24 (.10)
Note. Performance is shown as proportions of hits to studied items
(Repetitions 1–4) and false alarms (FA) to new items, for each condition:
incongruent (Inc), unrelated (Unr), and congruent (Con).
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between the incongruent and unrelated conditions, consistent with
a schema being necessary to violate before the incongruency
advantage emerges, but was higher in the congruent condition than
unrelated condition, consistent with a congruency advantage
emerging through additional postencoding processes. Such posten-
coding processes could include consolidation, reactivation or
retrieval-related processes; possibilities to which we return in the
general discussion.
Figure 3. Event memory: last critical trial. Mean (and error bars showing 95% confidence interval) of event
memory across Experiments 1–4 for the last Study trials for which memory was tested. High confidence responses
are shown in black for incongruent (inc) condition, in white for unrelated (unr) condition, and in gray for congruent
(con) condition (for raw data see, https://osf.io/ng3w9/). Note that the last trial tested in the incongruent condition was
the third rather than fourth trial in Experiment 2. A U-shaped function was predicted for Experiments 1–3, but not
Experiment 4, where no congruency advantage was predicted (see text). Memory accuracy is defined by the
proportion of hits minus false alarms, for high confidence responses.  p  .05.  p  .01.
Figure 4. Event memory: first trial tested. Mean (and error bars showing 95% confidence interval) of event
memory across Experiments 1–4 for the first trial for which memory was tested. High confidence responses are
shown in black for incongruent (inc) condition, in white for unrelated (unr) condition and in gray for congruent
(con) condition. Note that the first critical trial tested was the third rather than first trial in the incongruent
condition of Experiments 3–4, as distinguished by the checker pattern (see text). Memory accuracy is defined
by the proportion of hits minus false alarms, for high confidence responses.  p  .05.  p  .01.
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According to SLIMM, congruent events are more quickly con-
solidated into memory because they are more likely to be reacti-
vated (or replayed) when a schema is reactivated (because they are
consistent with that schema). Thus in the present paradigm, it is
likely that the first trial is more often retrieved during the subse-
quent three study trials in the congruent condition than in the other
conditions, further improving its encoding. It is also possible that
reactivating the schema in the final test phase improves retrieval of
all congruent trials, though it should be noted that knowledge of
the schema at test (e.g., remembering that umbrellas had twice the
value of shoes) did not on its own enable participants to distinguish
between old and new trials in the test of event memory (e.g.,
whether a specific trial with two umbrellas and one shoe ever
occurred at study).
However, an alternative interpretation for the U-shaped function
of memory for final trials is that performance in the unrelated
condition was impaired relative to the other conditions. For exam-
ple, participants might become frustrated with the frequent schema
reversals in the unrelated condition, causing them to “give up”
trying to learn the rule for the object-pair, impairing performance
on the final trials in this condition. Alternatively, negative feed-
back (particularly when surprising) might disrupt memory for
preceding trials, and this disruption, which would be most frequent
in the unrelated condition, might explain the worse performance on
the first trial in the unrelated condition than congruent condition.
We address these two possibilities in the next experiments,
reducing the probability that participants give up by having fewer
reversals in the unrelated condition (Experiments 2–4), by con-
trolling and measuring the potential influence of distraction (Ex-
periment 3–4), and most importantly, showing above-chance
prediction for final study trials in the unrelated condition (Exper-
iments 2–4).
Experiment 2
To test whether participants give up in the unrelated condition,
Experiment 2 introduced two changes: (a) value assignment in the
unrelated condition no longer switched between the third and
fourth trial, and (b) memory was assessed for the third trial instead
of fourth trial (Figure 2b). This not only reduced the total number
of schema changes in the unrelated condition, but also meant that
we could measure whether participants had given up: If partici-
pants were still trying to learn a schema in the unrelated condition,
their prediction accuracy for the fourth trial should now be above
chance (unlike in Experiment 1). However, to assess memory for
unrelated trials in the absence of a consistent schema, like in
Experiment 1, we tested memory for the third instead of fourth
study trial across all conditions.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four (15 females, mean age 22 years,
SD  4.65 years) volunteers were tested (see Experiment 1 for
additional details).
Procedure and materials. The procedure was identical to
Experiment 1, with the exception of testing event memory for the
third rather than fourth study trial, while still presenting a fourth
trial in which the same schema was used as in the third trial (Figure
2b). Note that this meant that the total proportion of schema
reversals across trials in Experiment 2 (33%) was lower than in
Experiment 1 (44%), which should also increase the overall in-
centive to attend to the schema in all conditions. It also meant that
after study, there had been three schema-consistent trials and one
schema-inconsistent trial in the unrelated condition, so that schema
memory should be above chance at test (unlike Experiment 1,
where there were two schema-consistent and two schema-
inconsistent trials).
Results
Schema learning and memory. Accuracy during study (see
Table 1) significantly increased to above chance on the third trial
of the congruent condition (con_3  .5: t(23)  18.93, p  .001,
MD  .32, CI [.29, .34], d  3.87). The incongruent condition
showed above chance accuracy for the second trial (inc_2  .5:
t(23) 12.17, p .001, MD .23, CI [.20, .26], d 2.49), which
switched to below chance when the schema reversed in the third
trial (inc_3  .5: t(23)  16.27, p  .001, MD  .35, CI
[.39, .31], d  3.32). The third trial in the unrelated condition
was also below chance (unr_3  .5: t(23)  9.50, p  .001,
MD  .30, CI [.35, .24], d  1.94). More importantly,
accuracy for the fourth unrelated trial, when the schema did not
change, was significantly above chance (unr_4  .5: t(23)  4.96,
p  .001, MD  .17, CI [.11, .23], d  1.01), indicating that
participants were still engaged in trying to learn the schema.
This schema knowledge was maintained at test (last row of
Table 1), with significantly higher accuracy for congruent than
incongruent new trials, t(23) 5.31, p .001, MD .16, CI [.11,
.22], d  1.09, though not for incongruent than unrelated new
trials, t(23) 0.26, p .80, two-tailed, MD .01, CI [.04, .06],
d  0.05. However, performance for incongruent, t(23)  2.75,
p  .01, MD  .058, CI [.02, .10], d  0.56, as well as unrelated
trials, t(23)  3.30, p  .002, MD  .05, CI [.03, .08], d  0.67
was slightly, but significantly, above chance.
Event memory: Third trial. Event memory for the third trial
(see Figure 3) was significantly better for congruent than unrelated
conditions (con_3unr_3: t(23)  1.79, p  .043, MD  .08,
CI [.004, .16], d  0.37) and was numerically, but not quite
significantly, better for incongruent than unrelated third trials
(inc_3unr_3: t(23)  1.62, p  .06, MD  .05, CI [.003, .10],
d  0.33).
Event memory: First trial. Analysis of first trials revealed no
significant differences between conditions, t(23)  0.60, p  .55,
two-tailed (Figure 4).
Discussion
We observed the same general U-shaped function of event
memory against congruency for third trials, even when prediction
accuracy of the fourth study trial in the unrelated condition was
above chance. The latter argues against the alternative possibility
considered in Experiment 1 that the U-shaped function reflects
decreased memory performance for the unrelated condition be-
cause participants ‘give up’ learning the schema.
Although memory for incongruent trials was numerically
greater than for unrelated trials, this did not reach significance
(unlike in Experiment 1). This is most likely because schemas had
not been learned as strongly by the third trial as they had by the
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fourth trial in Experiment 1. This likely reduced the prediction
error, weakening the incongruency advantage. We addressed this
in Experiment 3.
In contrast to Experiment 1, there was now a reliable schema in
the unrelated condition (obeyed by 3 of the 4 trials). This might
explain why the congruency advantage for the first trial was no
longer significant. We again addressed this in Experiment 3, which
had four aims: (a) to replicate the significance of the U-shaped
function by testing the fourth instead of third trial, which should
boost prediction strength similar to Experiment 1; (b) to eliminate
schema consistency for the first unrelated trial in order to repro-
duce the congruency advantage for first trials; (c) to maintain a
schema from third to fourth trial in the unrelated condition, similar
to Experiment 2, to reconfirm task engagement with above chance
prediction accuracy at study; and (d) to address the possibility
raised in Experiment 1 that frequent negative feedback might be
distracting and impair memory for preceding trials in the unrelated
condition.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 reverted to testing event memory for the fourth
trials, thereby increasing schema strength at the point of encoding
the critical trials relative to Experiment 2. This should replicate the
significant incongruency advantage of Experiment 1 that was only
a trend in Experiment 2. The second important change in Exper-
iment 3 was that the schema only reversed once in the unrelated
condition, between the first and second trials (Figure 2c). This
reduced the total number of reversals compared to Experiments 1
and 2 (and made it the same number as in the incongruent condi-
tion), further discouraging participants from giving up. Indeed, the
motivation to learn the schema in the unrelated condition could
again be measured by prediction accuracy on the fourth study trial.
The single reversal after the first unrelated trial also meant that
this trial was now incongruent with the (partial) schema that could
be established across Trials 2–4, which should reestablish the
advantage for the first trial in the congruent condition seen in
Experiment 1. However, the possibility remains that memory for
the first unrelated trial is impaired due to the distracting effect
of the negative feedback that is likely to follow on the subsequent
trial. To test this, we measured memory for the third trial, rather
than first trial, in the incongruent condition. The third incongruent
trial is also likely to be followed by negative feedback on the
subsequent trial, so should show similar memory impairments if
such negative feedback plays a key role.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four (14 females, mean age 26 years,
sd  5.23 years) volunteers were tested (for further details see
Experiment 1).
Materials and procedure. Material and procedure were the
same as described in Experiment 1, except that (a) the second rule
change in the unrelated condition was omitted, so that Trials 2–4
followed a consistent rule which, in contrast to Experiment 2,
rendered the first unrelated trial schema inconsistent, and (b) event
memory for the incongruent condition was tested for the third
instead of first trial (see Figure 2), to test hypotheses about the
distracting effects of negative feedback.
Results
Schema learning and memory. Accuracy at study (see Table
1) reached above chance for the final trial in the congruent con-
dition (con_4  .5: t(23)  16.21, p  .001, MD  .36, CI [.32,
.39], d  3.31), but decreased to below chance for the final trial in
the incongruent condition (inc_4  .5: t(23)  23.20, p  .001,
MD.39, CI [.41,.36], d4.74), as expected. However,
the unrelated condition now also showed above chance perfor-
mance for the final trial (unr_4  .5: t(23)  6.71, p  .001,
MD  .20, CI [.15, .25], d  1.37). Thus, unlike Experiment 1,
participants still acquired a coherent schema across the final three
trials in the unrelated conditions, despite the fact that this schema
differed from that on the first trial. Nonetheless, accuracy on the
final trial in the unrelated condition was still significantly less than
that in the congruent condition (unr_4 vs. con_4), t(23)  6.28,
p  .001, MD  .16, CI [.20, .11], d  1.28.
This schema knowledge was maintained at test (last row of
Table 1), with significantly higher accuracy for congruent than
unrelated new trials, t(23)  4.48, p  .001, MD  .11, CI [.07,
.15], d  0.91, though any difference between unrelated and
incongruent trials was not significant, t(23)  1.77, p  .090,
two-tailed, MD  .08, CI [.01, .17], d  0.40. Performance was
significantly above chance for both incongruent, t(23) 4.49, p
.001, MD  .15, CI [.10, .21], d  0.92, and unrelated, t(23) 
5.90, p  .001, MD  .23, CI [.16, .30], d  1.20, new trials.
Event memory: Last critical trial (3rd trial). Memory for
the fourth study trial was better in the incongruent than unrelated
condition (inc_4unr_4: t(23)  4.32, p  .001, MD  .15, CI
[.09, .21], d  0.88) and in the congruent than unrelated condition
(con_4unr_4: t(23)  2.31, p  .015, MD  .08, CI [.02, .15],
d  0.47), replicating again the predicted U-shaped function of
congruency (see Figure 3).
Event memory: First trial. Memory for the first study trial was
superior in the congruent than unrelated condition (con_1unr_1:
t(23)  2.26, p  .017, MD  .08, CI [.02, .14], d  0.46),
replicating Experiment 1 (see Figure 4). Memory for the third
incongruent trial was also significantly greater than the first unre-
lated trial (inc_3unr_1: t(23)  2.32, p  .015, MD  .08, CI
[.02, .14], d  0.47). If negative feedback from a schema reversal
impedes memory for trials directly preceding the reversal, this
would be most prominent for strong violations, that is, for incon-
gruent over unrelated trials. Our data show no evidence of such an
increased impediment, suggesting negative feedback is not a suf-
ficient explanation for the low memory performance for first trials
that precede a schema reversal in the unrelated condition.
Discussion
Experiment 3 replicated the significant U-shaped function of
event memory against congruency for final trials. The advantage
for the incongruent versus unrelated condition (left side of
U-shape) replicated Experiment 1, and was more reliable than in
Experiment 2, as we predicted based on the stronger schema at the
time of encoding (by testing fourth rather than third trials). Indeed,
this advantage for incongruent relative to unrelated trials occurred
even though the total number of schema-congruent trials was the
same (three out of four study trials). Prediction accuracy for the
fourth unrelated trial was again above chance, like in Experiment
2, suggesting that participants were still motivated to learn a
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schema and therefore paid attention to the objects in the unrelated
condition.
The advantage for first trials in the congruent condition, relative
to the unrelated condition, was now significant again (like Exper-
iment 1), most likely because the first trial in the unrelated con-
dition was inconsistent with the dominant schema in that condition
(unlike Experiment 2). This is again consistent with schemas
influencing memory even after encoding. Finally, memory for the
first unrelated trial was worse than for the third incongruent trial,
despite both trials being followed by a schema-reversal, suggesting
error feedback on the subsequent trial is unlikely to cause distrac-
tions that can account for the poor performance on the first trial in
the unrelated condition.
Experiments 1–3 suggest that the U-shaped function of event
memory against congruency is robust, with no obvious confound-
ing explanations. Moreover, different processes seem to underlie
the two ends of this function, because only the congruency advan-
tage remained when testing memory for initial trials, before a
schema has been learned (i.e., the left-hand side of the U-shape can
be selectively removed). The final experiment sought further evi-
dence for functional dissociation between these two extrema, by
making the number of objects an irrelevant detail of the study
task. As explained in the introduction, this third prediction of
the SLIMM model is based on the idea that prediction errors (as
in the incongruent condition) trigger the MTL system to encode
all aspects of a surprising event, including those that are irrel-
evant to the current schema, whereas events congruent with a
schema (in the congruent condition) are only encoded in terms
of details relevant to the schema. Therefore, if the number of
objects is no longer relevant to the schema, memory for this
detail should still be better for final trials in the incongruent
than unrelated condition, but not differ between the unrelated
and congruent condition—that is, the right-hand side of the
U-shape should be removed.
Experiment 4
Experiment 4 had an identical design to Experiment 3 (Figure
2D), except that the study task was to predict which of the two
object types had a higher value, regardless of the number of
exemplars. According to SLIMM, prediction errors should trigger
a complete encoding of the entire event, including incidental
information such as the number of exemplars, which should occur
for incongruent but not congruent events. We therefore expected
an incongruency advantage in the absence of a congruency advan-
tage, that is, inc_4  unr_4  con_4, for event memory of final
trials.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four (13 females, mean age 24, SD 
4.69) volunteers were tested (see Experiment 1 for details).
Materials and procedure. Materials and procedure were
identical to Experiment 3, except that participants were required to
decide whether the objects at the top or bottom had a higher value,
irrespective of how many exemplars of those objects were dis-
played. Participants were told one object in each pair had twice the
value of the other (but not which) and that only the assigned value
is relevant for performing the task accurately, regardless of the
number of exemplars. For instance, for a display of one umbrella
on top and two shoes on the bottom, with umbrella assigned the
value of 2 and shoe assigned the value of 1, the top display should
be selected (top  bottom). Participants therefore only made one
of two responses (the top and bottom displays could never have
equal value).
Results
Schema learning and memory. Accuracy at study (see Table
1) was above chance for the final trial in the congruent condition
(con_4 .5: t(23) 6.32, p .001, MD .21, CI [.15, .27], d
1.29), but decreased to below chance for the final trial in the
incongruent condition (inc_4  .5: t(23)  8.32, p  .001,
MD  .29, CI [.23, .35], d  1.70), as expected. The final
trial in the unrelated condition was also above chance (unr_4 .5:
t(23)  2.87, p  .004, MD  .06, CI [.02, .10], d  0.59).
The only surprising result was that performance on the second
trial in the unrelated condition, following the schema reversal, was
not less than chance (.50), as it was in Experiment 3. This could
reflect procedural changes between the two experiments, or simply
random error. Nonetheless, we do not think this affects the main
results, given that the remaining patterns of prediction accu-
racy, particularly for the critical first and final trials, were as
expected.
This schema knowledge was maintained at test (bottom row of
Table 1), with significantly higher accuracy for congruent than
unrelated new trials, t(23)  4.59, p  .001, MD  .18, CI [.11,
.25], d  0.94, though any difference between unrelated and
incongruent trials failed to reach significance, t(23)  0.35, p 
.73, two-tailed, MD  .02, CI [.09, .13], d  0.07. Nonetheless,
performance for incongruent, t(23)  4.54, p  .001, MD  .15,
CI [.09, .20], d 0.93, and unrelated new trials, t(23) 4.21, p
.001, MD  .16, CI [.10, .23], d  0.86, was significantly above
chance (0.5).
Event memory: Last critical trial (4th trial). Memory for
the fourth study trial was better for the incongruent relative to
unrelated condition (inc_4unr_4: t(23)  2.54, p  .009, MD 
.12, CI [.04, .21], d  0.52) and incongruent relative to congruent
condition (inc_4con_4: t(23)  4.16, p  .001, MD  .15, CI
[.09, .21], d  0.85), but did not differ significantly between the
congruent and unrelated conditions (con_4unr_4: t(23) 
0.77, p  .45, two-tailed, MD  .03, CI [.09, .04],
d  0.16), flattening the right side of the U-shaped function, as
predicted (see Figure 3).
Event memory: First trial. Memory for the first study trial
also failed to show any congruency advantage relative to the
unrelated condition (con_1unr_1: t(23)  0.89, p  .19,
MD  .03, CI [.09, .03], d  0.18), again consistent with
event details being irrelevant to the schema (see Figure 4). There
was no evidence of greater memory for the third incongruent trial
than first unrelated trial (inc_3  unr_1: t(23)  0.85, p  .40,
two-tailed, MD  0.03, CI [0.09, 0.04], d  0.22), unlike in
Experiment 3. This is also consistent with any schema that had
been established by the third trial of the incongruent condition no
longer being helpful for remembering irrelevant event information
as it was in Experiment 3.
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Discussion
Consistent with the third prediction of SLIMM outlined in the
introduction, when the number of exemplars was irrelevant to the
schema, there was no longer any advantage in event memory for
congruent relative to unrelated trials, for first or final trials. None-
theless, the advantage for incongruent relative to unrelated final
trials remained significant (despite schema knowledge at test not
differing between these conditions). This supports the claim that
different mechanisms underlie the two ends of the congruency
dimension.
General Discussion
We have demonstrated, for the first time within the same par-
adigm, better memory for the details of events that are either
congruent or incongruent with a schema, relative to unrelated
events. This U-shaped pattern of event memory as a function of
congruency was predicted by the SLIMM framework (van Kes-
teren et al., 2012), but has not been reported before. We think there
are at least two reasons for this. The first reason is theoretical:
studies have tended to focus on either schema theory (and the
advantage for congruent information) or distinctiveness theory
(and the advantage for incongruent information), that is, only ever
considered one side of the congruency dimension. The second
reason is methodological: most studies have only considered two
conditions, for example, memory for congruent versus incongruent
information (Bein et al., 2015; Brod et al., 2015), and therefore
lacked a third condition, for example, with weak (in)congruency,
that is necessary to observe a U-shape. There are other studies that
have explored a range of (subjectively defined) congruency levels
(e.g., van Kesteren et al., 2013; Lew & Howe, 2017), and found an
advantage of congruency. However, the memory tests in these
studies allowed prior knowledge (schemas) to aid performance at
retrieval. For example, when memory for the event “her handbag
contained a wallet” is cued by “handbag,” participants can use
prior knowledge to generate objects associated with handbags and
then recognize which object seems familiar (Watkins & Gardiner,
1979). By testing memory for information (number of objects) that
could not be generated by knowing the schema, we were able to
unmask the incongruency advantage (see also Greve et al., 2017,
for other ways to avoid use of schema at retrieval).
Not only did our study reveal a U-shaped function of event
memory against schema congruency for the first time, but it further
supported the SLIMM predictions that qualitatively different
mechanisms underlie the two ends of the congruency dimension.
We dissociated these two ends of this U-shape in two separate
ways: in terms of (a) underlying process, that is, whether the
memory advantage arises during or after encoding; and (b) nature
of the memory, that is, whether incidental details are also remem-
bered better. In terms of encoding processes, Experiment 1 and 3
showed an advantage for the first trial in the congruent condition
relative to other conditions, even though all conditions were in-
distinguishable at this stage. This suggests that the effect of
schema congruency can benefit postencoding processes too. By
comparison, prediction errors require schemas to be established,
before they can enhance encoding in the incongruent condition.
Moreover, the stronger the schema, the bigger the prediction error,
which can explain why Experiment 2 showed a weaker incongru-
ency advantage than other experiments after presenting only two
rather than three congruent trials.
In terms of the nature of the memory, Experiment 4 abolished
the congruency advantage, without affecting the incongruency
advantage, by rendering event details irrelevant to the schema.
This is consistent with SLIMM’s claim that prediction errors
prompt memory processes that engage the medial temporal lobes
(MTL) to encode all details of the current event, even if irrelevant
to the current schema. This complete encoding is likely to have
adaptive value because the particular detail(s) causing the predic-
tion error might become apparent in future, potentially requiring an
update or change of schema. Thus, the U-shaped function of
congruency does not reflect a single quantitative factor (e.g., lack
of attention to inconsistent schema, as tested in Experiment 2–3),
but rather qualitatively different memory processes operating at
each extreme.
As noted in the introduction, there are several related theories
concerning the memory advantage for unexpected events, such as
distinctiveness (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993; Hunt & Worthen, 2006;
Murdock, 1960). This theory allows for distinct items to benefit at
retrieval (e.g., for isolates at the start of lists). Although Schmidt
and Schmidt (2017) demonstrated that memory benefits for unex-
pected items (isolates) arise at encoding as well as retrieval, the
SLIMM framework does not address the latter, that is, how isolates
benefit from retrieval processes (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993; Raja-
ram, 1996; Reder, Donavos, & Erickson, 2002). However, we
suspect that such retrieval effects require the content of the unex-
pected event to be distinct from that of other events. In the present
paradigm, the content tested by our event memory test (the number
of objects) is no more distinct for unexpected than expected trials,
at least in the sense that the incongruent trials are not perceptually
or conceptually distinct (what Schmidt, 1991, called primary dis-
tinctiveness). What renders a trial unexpected is simply whether
that content violates the currently active schema (more akin to
Schmidt’s “secondary distinctiveness”). Moreover, because trials
were intermixed across conditions, the overall rate of negative
feedback was relatively high, such that feedback itself is an un-
likely source of distinctiveness. Incongruent events were not tem-
porally distinct either. Thus, unexpected trials do not necessarily
“stand out” as different at the time of test, which is why we think
they are better explained by encoding-related prediction error than
the more generic notion of distinctiveness.
A similar issue arises in relation to theories of “novelty” in
memory (e.g., Tulving & Kroll, 1995). As argued in Henson and
Gagnepain (2010), prediction error is more than just novelty, given
that a novel item in a novel context might constitute maximum
novelty, but have no prediction error (because the novel context
provides no schema for predictions). Moreover, the event infor-
mation tested in the present paradigm is not inherently novel;
again, what is “novel” is whether the type of feedback is expected
or unexpected. Thus we doubt that the present results can be
accommodated by the “novelty-encoding hypothesis” (Greene,
1999; Kinsbourne & George, 1974; Kormi-Nouri, Nilsson, &
Ohta, 2005; Tulving & Kroll, 1995). Indeed, subsequent work has
cast doubt on this effect being truly encoding-related, pointing
instead toward higher retrieval costs for familiar than novel items,
that is, increased source confusion and false alarm rates (Dobbins
et al., 1998). After controlling for such potential confounds, stud-
ies have shown better memory for familiar than novel items
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(Poppenk, Köhler, & Moscovitch, 2010; Poppenk, McIntosh,
Craik, & Moscovitch, 2010).
Given that the content of our incongruent trials was neither
novel nor distinct, we propose that it was the prediction errors
elicited by unexpected type of feedback that drove better encoding,
consistent with studies examining the role of such corrective
feedback in learning (Butterfield & Metcalfe, 2001, 2006; Fazio &
Marsh, 2009; Metcalfe, 2017). Interestingly, errors made with high
confidence are more likely to be remembered accurately after
corrective feedback than errors made with low confidence, a
finding termed the hypercorrection effect (Butterfield & Metcalfe,
2001). High-confidence errors are thought to attract higher levels
of attention due to the discrepancy between subjective assessment
and performance. Studies testing this hypothesis using divided
attention paradigms have shown a decline in secondary task per-
formance when feedback for high confidence errors are processed,
confirming increased attentional resources and suggesting that
more sustained processing of the corrective information is the
cause of this effect (Butterfield & Metcalfe, 2001, 2006; Fazio &
Marsh, 2009). Nevertheless, although attention may mediate the
improved learning, the underlying cause must be an initial predic-
tion error (Greve et al., 2017; Henson & Gagnepain, 2010). Inter-
estingly, the confidence of a prediction tends to be correlated with
how much a participant knows about the target domain (Butterfield
& Metcalfe, 2001) and a study by Sitzman, Rhodes, and Tauber
(2014) demonstrated that prior domain knowledge, and not re-
sponse confidence per se, increases the likelihood of incorporating
new information into memory, which is consistent with the present
findings.
Regarding the other end of the congruency continuum—the
congruency effect—this is consistent with many previous findings
(e.g., Atienza et al., 2011; Alba & Hasher, 1983; Bein et al., 2015;
Cycowicz et al., 2008; Craik & Tulving, 1975), including reports
of better memory for words that have preexisting semantic, asso-
ciative or thematic relationships (Craik & Tulving, 1975; Kriu-
kova, Bridger, & Mecklinger, 2013; Roediger & McDermott,
1995). For example, recognition memory studies show superior
memory for related than unrelated word pairs (Greve, van Rossum,
& Donaldson, 2007; Rhodes & Donaldson, 2007) and amnesic
patients exhibit impaired associative memory for randomly paired
words, but preserved recognition of highly related words (Cutting,
1978; Shimamura & Squire, 1984; Winocur & Kinsbourne, 1978).
This mnemonic advantage is thought to reflect facilitated acquisi-
tion of related items because they activate and strengthen preex-
isting semantic associations, while unrelated items require the
creation of new associations (Wickelgren, 1979). Although this
resonates with the mnemonic advantages for schema-congruent
items found here, an additional characteristic that distinguishes
schemas from preexisting semantic associations is their ability to
abstract and therefore generalize to new situations (e.g., for a rule
to be applied to new trials in the present paradigm). A recent study
investigated whether schemas support the mnemonic advantage
that arises when a new relationship between words is made explicit
through a definition, in order to encourage their binding as a
“unitized” representation. However, the authors found no evidence
that this representation generalized to other semantically related
words, contrary to what would be expected if a schema had been
formed, which suggests that unitization is different from schema-
tization (Tibon, Greve, & Henson, 2018). Future work is needed to
distinguish the simple reactivation of prior semantic associations
from the more flexible abstraction of a schema and from the less
flexible recoding of associations into single units.
It is important to note that our design meant that memory for the
schema (rule) could not help retrieve a specific trial at test, in that
knowledge of the rule would not, on its own, allow one to guess
whether a specific combination of exemplars had been studied
(i.e., we controlled for a “generate-and-recognize” strategy), sug-
gesting that the congruency advantage does not arise from
retrieval-related processes at test. Rather, the postencoding con-
gruency advantage seems more likely to arise from consolidation
or reactivation processes operating between encoding and re-
trieval. Systems-level consolidation is believed to involve gradual
reorganisation over an extended period of time (Frankland &
Bontempi, 2005), so is unlikely to occur over the brief study-test
delay used here. The congruency advantage is more likely, we
think, to occur during the study phase, reflecting the reactivation of
previous congruent trials during the encoding of new trials, result-
ing in additional encoding opportunities for congruent trials (see
also van Kesteren et al., 2012).
This mechanism mediating the congruency advantage for first
trials may relate to the within-list primacy effects found for cate-
gorized lists: In previous studies, lists containing blocks of items
from the same category (e.g., flowers, animals, countries, etc.)
reveal a memory advantage for the first item within each block,
even if those items occurred in the middle of the list as a whole
(e.g., Gorfein, Arbak, Phillips, & Squillace, 1976). This effect has
been attributed to increased rehearsal of items from the same
category, for which the category name becomes an implicit asso-
ciative response: The later occurrence of an item cues its category
name, which reactivates earlier items of the same category, im-
proving their encoding (Underwood & Freund, 1969; Wood &
Underwood, 1967). Learning of schema congruent information
might operate in similar ways. Our paradigm repeatedly presents
the same object pairs within the same conditions. The second
encounter of a pair might reactivate an earlier memory of that pair,
which strengthens it and makes it more likely to be remembered.
Although this benefit should occur across all conditions, trials that
share not only the same objects but also the same rule or schema
might have an added advantage of enhanced reactivation. Future
studies are needed to test this possible explanation more closely.
In general, one could argue that our simple rules, learned during
the course of the experiment, do not conform to the concept of
schemas used in previous research (see Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014 for
review). Schemas are usually conceived as rich and complex
abstract structures that summarize knowledge about the real-world,
and that are used, for example, in reconstructing autobiographical
memories, as suggested by the basic-systems model (Rubin, 2006).
Furthermore, the schemas used in many previous studies normally
exist pre-experimentally and were acquired and consolidated over
many days or years (Anderson, 1981; Gilboa & Marlatte, 2017;
Kole & Healy, 2007; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Stangor &
McMillan, 1992). However, by distilling the concept to its minimal
features of an abstract structure that can influence encoding of new
information (the individual trials), we would argue that we were
able to achieve more experimental flexibility and control than in
previous studies. For example, only by training new schemas
during the experiment could we examine their effect on memory
for event information presented before they had been established.
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Our concept of schema was influenced by the neuroscientific
perspective offered by SLIMM (van Kesteren et al., 2012), as the
set of currently active cortical representations than influence on-
line processing. Even if one would prefer to reserve the term
schema for more complex, real-world knowledge, we believe our
results still reveal important insights on the factors determining
event memory. Future work could test whether the findings here
generalize to more established, complex structures.
More research is also needed to investigate the brain mecha-
nisms underlying the qualitatively distinct mechanisms proposed
here. For instance, the neural underpinnings of the behavioral
U-shape function obtained in Experiment 3 could be investigated
using functional MRI. According to SLIMM, prediction errors
(i.e., fourth trial in the incongruent condition) are expected to
increase activity in the MTL in order to store a complete repre-
sentation of the surprising event, including any incidental infor-
mation. Highly congruent items (i.e., fourth trial in the congruent
condition), on the other hand, should elicit activation in mPFC, to
facilitate rapid cortical learning of the new event. Furthermore, for
high levels of congruency, the mPFC is believed to suppress MTL
activity so that novel perceptual details that are unrelated to the
activated schema will not be encoded, a prediction which can be
tested by using effective connectivity. The behavioral patterns
could also be tested in patients with selective lesions of mPFC or
MTL. Patients with mPFC lesions would be predicted to show an
attenuated congruency advantage, if their mPFC is unable to use
the presence of a schema to enhance cortical learning. The pre-
diction for patients with MTL damage is less clear however.
Although they would be predicted to show the complementary
pattern of an attenuated incongruency advantage, they may also
show an attenuated congruency advantage in the present paradigm,
because the paradigm requires learning of new schema (during the
study phase), which is also likely to be impaired by MTL damage.
Ideally this would be tested by MTL disruption after schema
learning, for example by using a variant of the present paradigm in
which the schema exist pre-experimentally.
Recently, prediction error models have become increasingly
influential in the neuroscience literature and numerous studies
have linked the firing of dopamine neurons in the midbrain to the
experience of a reward that was not anticipated, that is, a reward
prediction error (Bayer & Glimcher, 2005; Eshel et al., 2015;
Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). The phasic firing of dopa-
mine neurons relates to the size and subjective value of the
unexpected reward (Eshel, Tian, Bukwich, & Uchida, 2016; Hol-
lerman & Schultz, 1998; Roesch, Calu, & Schoenbaum, 2007); it
shows an increased level of activity when a reward is greater than
predicted (positive prediction error), remains at baseline when a
reward is fully predicted and reveals depressed activity when a
reward is less than predicted (negative prediction error). Recent
studies have identified a network of brain regions involved in new
learning on the basis of this error signal, namely a dopamine-
dependent loop which includes the ventral striatum, the substantia
nigra/ventral tegmental area (SN/VTA), and the hippocampus (SN/
VTA-HC loop; Lisman & Grace, 2005; Lisman, Grace, & Duzel,
2011; Shohamy & Adcock, 2010). Importantly, the evidence for
this network is based mainly on reinforcement learning paradigms,
that is, when learning is motivated by external rewards, whereas
our paradigm elicits prediction errors in the absence of external
rewards. Although some studies suggest that internally driven
learning can in itself be rewarding (Ripolles et al., 2014), and that
intrinsic motivational states (e.g., curiosity) can support memory
formation by engaging the SN/VTA-HC loop (Gruber, Gelman, &
Ranganath, 2014), it remains to be tested whether the prediction
errors elicited in paradigms like ours engage similar dopaminergic
mechanisms. Future studies could examine how external reward
might enhance memory in our paradigm. If dopamine is involved,
we would predict suppressed dopamine for incongruent trials,
elicited by the negative prediction error which weakens future
expectation of the incorrectly predicted outcome, but no change in
dopamine for schema congruent trials (i.e., critical fourth trial), for
which a correct response/reward is fully predicted. Thus it is not
obvious how a dopaminergic network could fully explain the
superior memory we observe at both extremes of the congruency
spectrum.
Taken together, our findings bring together two strands of
psychological research: one concerning schema and congruency
and another concerning distinctiveness, novelty and prediction
error. Furthermore, they relate these strands to recent neuroscien-
tific research about the brain systems supporting memory. More
specifically, we tested and confirmed the predictions for a
U-shaped function with dissociable tails that was predicted in
advance by van Kesteren et al. (2012) in terms of the neuroscien-
tific SLIMM framework. This framework postulates distinct brain
systems to handle the opposing demands of, on the one hand,
benefitting from reoccurring regularities and schema to enable
efficient encoding of our environment, and on the other hand, of
accommodating surprising information that does not match prior
expectations, which is essential for flexible adaptation to an ever-
changing environment.
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